1. As shall be seen later, a set of karikas in question begins with the assertion that for Samsargavadins an entity (bhava) is a sakti or has a Sakti. Helaraja identifies the Samsargavadins as Vaisesikas. Before coming on to the main task, it is desirable to clarify the point of how it is to be understood that Bhartrhari seems to describe a Vaisesika view on Sakti. It is well-known that none of the ancient Vaisesika sources except *Dasapadarthl recognizes the Sakti in its system. It is less than likely that Bhartrhari there is really describing a Vaisesika view on Sakti existing in his time. In order to determine how Bhartrhari deals with the Vaisesika system in relation to Sakti, first let us consider the following karikas in VP III, jti, kk. 22-24.
[1] sarvasaktyatmabhutatvam ekasyaiveti nimayah/ bhavanam atmabhedasya kalpana syad anarthika //22// "The final and ultimate truth (nirnaya) is that [Brahman which is] the One is identical with ( 16 ) From Bhartrhari's monistic standpoint, the One, Brahman, has all the Saktls the manifoldness of which is inferred from that of its effects (bhinnalaksana, lit. `what is known through its different [activities to produce its effects]'). The manifoldness of its effects ultimately leads to that of verbal behavior (vyavaharavaicitrya), since the reality, unlimited by anything, is beyond verbalization and hence the multiplicity of the phenomenal world can be accounted for by its saktis as its limiting factors (upadhi). Bhartrhari draws this sakti-view of his own into the Vaisesika category theory, saying that all categories postulated by Vaisesikas, dravya, guna, karman, samanya, visesa and samavaya, are nothing but the substitutes of saktis the One has. One can thus get a glimpse of his perspectivism here also. Interesting is that Bhartrhari intends to reduce the Vaisesika categories to the One. He applies the logic that an aggregate (samagrata) of saktis realized as those categories is not a separate entity from the saktis and the latter are not different from the One, and thereby tacitly accepts that the Vaisesika system of thought is also conducive to the attainment of human goals (purusartha). Although the categorial status of gakti has been subject to some debate within the Vaisesika itself, to be concerned with its categorial independency is one thing and to identify it with an entity as postulated in that system is another. It is clear, therefore, that ( 17 in VP III, sadhana, kk. 9 (-) 15 Bhartrhari never attributes to the Samsargavadins a view such that everything that is a sakti or has a sakti is an entity (bhava). He is reformulating Vaisesika-views in a sakti-terminology there, from his own view of the phenomenal world as Brahman's apparent unfolding through its saktis.
2. Now let us turn to our main point. In the preceding karikas (in VP III, sadhana, kk.
1-8),Bhartrhari has explained that sadhana as the accomplisher of an action is the samarthya (= sakti), in the view that samarthya has an independent existence of a substance as its possessor (dravyavyatiriktasakti). The basic argument for equating saktis with the Vaisesika categories is, as opposed to that, that a sakti is not different from a substance (dravyavyatiriktasakti). Bhartrhari opens the equation by saying as follows: Two points are made: 1) When entities (bhava) produce their own effects, they themselves (svarupa) and their cooperators (sahakarin) are respectively regarded as saktis.
Cooperators are saktis and a cause (karana) is their possessor (saktimat); similarly, for cooperators also, the cause is the sakti and they themselves are its possessors. Therefore, every entity (bhava) is a sakti and has a sakti; separately from them, Helaraja adds, there is nothing called sakti that is beyond perception and that is other than six categories : dravya, guna, karman, samanya, visesa, and samavaya.
2) A further point, which will be explained in detail in the karika 13, is that the property of being a sadhana, that is, the sakti, is not expressed as it is by its own word. It is expressed as it is by a nominal ending (vibhakti) and certain other linguistic elements. This is because the sakti which is of a dependent nature (paratantra) looses its property of dependence when it is substantialized (dravyayamana) and denoted by a nominal such as sakti. Recall that Patanjali looks upon it as guna (MBh on P3.2-115: gunah sadhanam). And, in connection with this, it is to be noted that all characteristics that Bhartrhari in VP III, guna, k. 1 describes as taken on by a guna should be attributed to the sakti also;thus, it is samsargin ('what is connected with something'), bhedaka ( 18 ) Bhartrhari on Sakti : the Vai §esika Categories as Saktis (H . OGAWA) (`a differentiator') and paratantra ('something dependent').
Next Bhartrhari continues to adduce instances in the following karikas (VP III , by the word bhava when Bhartrhari says that every entity is a sakti and a saktipossessor.
[3] ghatasya drsikannatve mahattvadini sadhanaml rzlpasya drsikarmatve rapatvadni sadhanam//10// " [For example ,] in the case where a pot is a karman in correlation to the action of seeing, the `largeness' and others are the sadhana . [And] in the case where a color is a kar7nan in a correlation to the action of seeing, the colorness (rupatva) and others are the sadhana."
1) The situation in which ghatam pasyati ('He sees a pot') is uttered and the Vaisesikasutra VI. 1-6: mahaty anekadravyavattvad rupac copalabdhih are taken into consideration by Helaraja. According to the Vaisesikas, in consequence of the property of both anekadravyavattva2' and rupa ('color'), there arises the perception with reference to a large (mahat) substance. In the case of the perception of a pot, therefore, the property of anekadravyavattva and the color (rupa), which belong to the substance pot that has become the karman in correlation to the action of seeing (darsanakriya), are deemed saktis insofar as they inhere in the pot itself. The `largeness' (mahattva) spoken of here as sadhana, which is a parimanavisesa and hence a kind of guna, is regarded as indirect cause of that perception in that it conditions the domain of that perception.
2) Concerning the second line of the present karika, the utterance rupam pasyatl ('He sees a color') and the Vaisesikasutra IV. 1.8 : anekadravyasamavayad rupavisesac ca rupopalabdhih are taken into account. The same sutra is given in the Nyayasutra (III.
1.38). Although Helaraja introduces the interpretation of rupavisesa as udbhutatva ('manifested-ness'), which accords that of the Nyayabhasya, the word rupavisesa is to be taken as standing for the limited universal (samanya visesa), which is in conformity with what is meant by the word rupatva here in this karika. In the case of the utterance rupam pasyati, the universal `colorness' (rupatva) which inheres in the color itself and the inherence (samavaya) of the color in a substance formed of more than ( 19 ) one substance are considered to be Saktis in correlation to the action ' of seeing the color.
[4] svaih samanyavisesais ca saktimanto rasadayahl niyatagrahana Joke saktayas tas tathasrayaih. //11// "And , a taste and other [qualities] Saktis to bring about the understanding of the properties themselves, since they delimit the properties. In like manner, it is also to be known that a substance that is the locus of a taste is also the gakti to bring about the perception of it.
[5] indriyarthamanahkartrsambandhah sadhanam kvacit/l2ab/ "In some cases , the object-external sense organ-internal organ-agent relationship is the sadhana.
From the self-internal organ-external sense organ-object connection (atmendriyamanorthasannikarsa) is produced the knowledge of the color and other [qualities] ; therefore the contact (samyoga) is a gakti. Moreover, from the Vaigesikasiltra IV. I .12: sap2khyah parimanani prthaktvam samyogavibhagau karma ca rupidravyasamavayac caksusani, it may be said that samava`ya is also a . akti. Thus the relation (sambandha)
in general is also a Sakti, which is affirmed in VP III, sambandha, k. 5 (saktinam api sa [=sambandhah] saktih).
In this way, Bhartrhari shows that mahattva (guna), rupatva (samanyavisesa), rasa (guna), dravya and sambandha (samyoga and samavaya), being bhava, can be identified with Saktis. What should be drawn from the identification of Saktis with the Vaisesika categories is now described in the following karika.
[6] yad yada yadanugrahi tat tada tatra sadhanam //12cd// "[Or rather ,] when a cretain thing x renders service to a certain thing y, the thing x is the sadhana for the thing y." 3'
The pervasion (vyapti) between anugrahitva (upakarakatva) and sadhanatva (saktitva) is shown here, in the formulation of which Bhartrhari's own view is clearly reflected. According to him, whatever renders service to others and hence is dependent upon others follows the definition of the sakti (Helaraja : paropakari paratantram sarvam saktilaksanam anupatati). Interestingly Bhartrhari applies this pervasion to an action (kriya) in VP III, kk. 16-17, stating that an action is also a sadhana. , it is assumed to be a sadhana on the basis of the distinction [between upakarya ('service-receiver') and upakiraka ('service-renderer'), in other words, the one between entities]." 1) As has been stated, as in ghatah karma ('The pot is an object [in relation to a certain action]'), by words such as `karman' and `sadhana' a substance in which the function of rendering service to an action (kriyopakara) is observed is denoted as something principal. From these words, however, the property of being a sadhana which is characterized by the rendering of service to an action is not understood as springing up (samudbhuta). Therefore, when a certain entity is denoted by the word sadhana, it is in the state of being potentially capable of bringing about an action (yogyatamatra).
2) The question of what property (dharma) is characterized by the upakara and becomes sadhana (= sakti) is answered. It is, says Bhartrhari, the property of being a cause (nimittabhava, hetubhava). This property is nothing but the gakti (Helaraja: hetubhavah saktyaparaparyayah). However, it is when such a property is known as having been actually realized (siddhah = nispannataya pratiyamanah) that it is regarded as the saktl ; it is not called gakti on the basis of the mere possibility of its belonging to a cretain entity (sambhavamatrena).
3) According to Bhartrhari, whether the theory be accepted that a gakti is not distinct from an entity or saktls be distinct from entities, one cannot have the notion of the saktl without the distinction (vyatireka) between upakarya and upakaraka which requires that there be different entities. For one arrives at a sakti only when there are different entities and some service is rendered from one thing to another.
3. Thus the features of the gakti which has been made clear through Bhartrhari's above-mentioned identification of saktls with Vaisesika categories and his remarks on it are as follows (22) Bhartrhari on Sakti : the Vai §esika Categories as Saktis (H. OGAWA) 1) In order for a certain entity to be treated as a sakti, there has to be the servicerendering (upakara) and hence there must be the distinction between upakarya and upakaraka, in other words, the difference between entities. Whatever renders service to others is a sakti.
2) There is no fixed saktl. Related things (samsargin) mutually have the property of being the sakti since one thing cannot render service to another if there is no connection between them at all. On the assumption that a certain relation subsists between two different entities, if one entity is assumed to render service to another, the former in the state of rendering service is a sakti and the latter in the state of being rendered service (upakarya) its holder (saktimat).
3) Saktis are not expressed as they are by their own words.
1) Concerning the phrase sambandhisambandhasamsarge'pi, Helaraja suggests a variant reading and gives a different interpretation, which need not be discussed here.
2) Helaraja gives the following interpretation of the word anekadravayavattava : "The word anekadravya refers to the thing x which has for its samavayikarana more than one substance, such as a dyad (dvyanuka) and others.
[And] the word anekadravyavat refers to the thing y which has the thing x, that is, that which is formed of the thing x. The word anekadravyavattva refers to the property (bhava) of the thing y."
3) See VP III, dig, k. bcd also.
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